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Introduction
At the close of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
in 1994, when the member governments of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT)1 established the World Trade Organization (WTO),
2
two of their avowed goals were to assist developing and Least Developed
Countries (LDCs) in "securing a share in the growth in international
T B.A., University of Texas, 2004; Candidate for J.D., Cornell Law School, 2007. I
would like to thank my father, Dennis Stostad, for his patient proofreading and helpful
suggestions.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
2. See generally Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
Marakesh Agreement].
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trade,"'3 and to establish a more robust and reliable procedure for the reso-
lution of trade disputes among member countries. 4 Indeed, as to the latter
goal, Article 111:3 of the Marrakesh Agreement makes clear that dispute
resolution is one of the five key functions of the WTO.5 With respect to
dispute settlement, it has been pointed out that a well-functioning system
will generate "positive externalities" in that a challenged trade barrier or
other WTO-inconsistent measure may often affect parties other than the
member country bringing the challenge. 6 Moreover, good dispute resolu-
tion reduces uncertainty in the marketplace by securing market access
rights, thereby promoting efficiency in the global economy. As to the goal
of stimulating growth in developing countries, the value of pursuing this
end is accepted by scholars as virtually axiomatic, and its merits hardly
require defense here. In any case, both of these laudable ambitions are
stated overtly in the WTO's founding documents. How successful has the
WTO been in achieving them?
The scholarly literature on world trade law has produced a lively
debate concerning the effectiveness of WTO dispute resolution generally,
and its impact on developing countries in particular. 7 Embodied in the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), 8 the new procedures differ from
those used under GATT principally in that they are more formal. The
change from GATT to the WTO is often described as a shift from a largely
diplomacy-based, or negotiated, apparatus for dispute resolution to a more
rules-based, or adjudicatory, model. 9 To name just two examples of this
"judicialization," the new procedures added provisions for an automatic
right of appellate review and, for the first time, made the decisions of dis-
pute settlement panels automatically binding on the parties. 10 This latter
feature of the new system was itself considered a major reform because the
old rules had made it extremely easy (at least in theory) for a respondent to
block the adoption of an adverse ruling.'1  The change to a more judicial
process was thought by many to be of particular importance to poorer
member countries, whose lack of resources gave them relatively less bar-
3. Id. at Preamble.
4. Id. at art. 111:3.
5. Id.
6. Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing
Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 861, 862
(2005).
7. See infra § 11.
8. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 2 [hereinafter DSU].
9. See, e.g., Thomas Schoenbaum, WTO Dispute Settlement: Praise and Suggestions
for Reform, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 647, 648 (1998) (observing that the system now
"functions very much like a court of international trade"); see also Thomas A. Zimmer-
man, WTO Dispute Settlement at Ten: Evolution, Experiences, and Evaluation, 60:1 Aus-
SENWIRTSCHAET: SWIss REv. INT'L ECON. REL. 28, 30-31 (2005) (describing both
"negotiation-oriented" and "rule-oriented" elements of the DSU).
10. See infra § 1.
11. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
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gaining leverage in more diplomatic contexts. 12 The WTO's website under-
scores this very point, proposing that the new system helps to "mitigate the
imbalances between stronger and weaker players by having their disputes
settled on the basis of rules rather than having power determine the out-
come." 13 Moreover, from the DSU's beginning, optimistic observers have
pointed to the increased dispute settlement activity by developing countries
as evidence of the new system's success.
14
Commentators, however, are far from unanimous in their praises. As
emphasized in the literature, a cursory glance at the data reveals the United
States and the European Community (EC) to be the largest users of the
DSU, together appearing as complainants in more than 150 cases, or close
to half of the total number of cases that have been filed.15 By contrast,
developing countries seldom invoke the DSU and, significantly, only one
case has been brought by a complainant classified as an LDC. 16 Of greater
concern than this mere disparity is the possibility that, as some scholars
persuasively argue, developing countries are actually underutilizing the
DSU, filing fewer cases than their wealthier counterparts relative to the
number of actionable claims they may have. 1 7 If this is true, it is cause for
alarm not only because of its impact on the developing countries affected
but also because of its tendency to undermine the perceived reliability and
legitimacy of the system as a whole. Still more concerning is the possibility
that such underutilization is attributable to systemic biases in the DSU
itself, which may discourage developing countries from seeking to enforce
their rights through formal dispute settlement. Ironically, these biases may
find their origins in the judicializing features of the DSU that were origi-
nally intended as organic reforms. It is this proposition that I seek to
examine in this Note.
This Note takes the position that the partial judicialization of the DSU,
initially intended to safeguard the rights of poor countries, has actually
12. See, e.g., Kofi Oteng Kufuor, From GATT to the WTO: The Developing Countries
and the Reform of the Procedures for the Settlement of International Trade Disputes, 31 J.
WORLD TRADE 117 (1997) (arguing that the dispute resolution mechanisms established
under the WTO represent a major improvement over those of GATT); see also Beatrice
Chaytor, Dispute Settlement under the GATT/WTO: The Experience of Developing
Nations, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE W TO 250, 251 (James Cameron & Karen Camp-
bell eds., 1998) (observing that "the 'rules-based' organisation of the WTO seems to
have decreased the risk that the system will be hampered by economic and political
pressures").
13. World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Introduc-
tion to the WTO Dispute Settlement System, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-
e/disp settlementcbt e/clslple.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2006).
14. See, e.g., E. U. PETERSMAN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 202 (1997); see
also Renato Ruggiero, Address to the Institute for International Economics Conference,
Washington D.C., (Apr. 15, 1998) available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-..e/sprr
_e/bergen.e.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2006).
15. This figure is my own, based on data which are available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop e/dispu e/dispu e.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2006).
16. India-Anti-dumping Measure on Batteries from Bangladesh, WT/DS306.
17. See infra § 11.
Cornell International Law Journal
made dispute settlement procedures less accessible to poorer member
states. The reasons for this will be discussed at length below but, as a
preliminary example, the vastly increased complexity of the substantive
law, coupled with the more formal, quasi-judicial litigation process, has
imposed enormous costs on would-be users of the system, both in the pre-
litigation stage (when a country first identifies the existence of a disputa-
ble trade measure) and during the litigation itself (when substantial legal
expertise is needed to "try" a case). Thus, perhaps to a degree greater than
before, successful dispute settlement now depends on a country's ability to
muster considerable economic and "human capital" resources of the kind
developing countries typically lack.
In describing my thesis, however, I find it necessary also to circum-
scribe it. For example, I differ with those who feel that the move toward
judicialization is a bad idea per se. On the contrary, I would argue that a
more judicialized process-one that depends more on rules than on influ-
ence-may ultimately be just what is needed to rid the dispute settlement
system of its inequities. This argument may at first appear somewhat
counterintuitive: If "a lot" of judicial process is desirable, then it should
follow, afortiori, that "a little" judicial process is at least a good start. But
in reality, it would appear that in implementing only some of the features
commonly associated with judicial process, while omitting others, the
WTO member countries have unwittingly unleashed a system that, at least
in some respects, is performing less effectively than its predecessor. For
example, one of the many judicial features lacking from the present system
is a reliable enforcement mechanism. Thus, a country's ability to enforce a
favorable ruling by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) still depends in
large part upon its economic might. By partially judicializing the dispute
settlement process, but not completely doing so, the member countries
have created a system that imposes many of the costs of complex litigation,
without guaranteeing the corresponding benefits that such a system is
designed to secure.
The remainder of this note proceeds as follows: Part I supplies a brief
overview of both the history and procedures of WTO dispute settlement.
Here, I try to highlight the most judicialized aspects of the DSU, as com-
pared to the procedures that existed under GATT. Part II surveys the schol-
arly literature on the DSU, addressing whether WTO dispute settlement
has generally improved upon GATT, and how it has impacted poorer coun-
tries in particular. I conclude that power imbalances between rich and
poor countries continue to determine who is able to use the system suc-
cessfully, and that the partial judicialization discussed in the foregoing sec-
tion has, if anything, only exacerbated the problem. Part III proposes a
number of reforms that could ameliorate the problem of inequality of
access, by moving towards more-not less-judicial process. The final part
concludes.
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I. Background: Dispute Settlement from GATT to the WTO
A. History: Origins of the WTO
GATT finds its roots in the failed attempt, shortly after World War II,
to form a WTO-like organization called the International Trade Organiza-
tion (ITO). 18 Although preliminary negotiations on an ITO charter were
concluded successfully, its formation ultimately failed under circum-
stances similar to those that plagued the League of Nations following
World War I: The US Senate failed to ratify its charter.19 All was not lost
however, as 23 of the participating nations succeeded in ratifying GATT.
20
Though originally envisioned as an interim measure, 2 1 awaiting the forma-
tion of the ITO, GATT was ultimately established as a permanent arrange-
ment, whose membership grew steadily in succeeding years. It expanded to
128 countries by the end of the Uruguay Round, 22 and to 149 countries
today.
2 3
The modern WTO is essentially an institutional outgrowth of GATT
but introduces a number of important changes. Unlike the pre-Uruguay
GATT, which gave member states the flexibility to opt out of certain provi-
sions, 24 the WTO adopted the so-called "single undertaking" principle
which, with a few exceptions, 25 bound all countries to all aspects of the
agreement. 26 This all-or-nothing approach becomes all the more important
when viewed in light of the other changes ushered in by the Uruguay
Round. Initially, GATT focused exclusively on tariffs, gradually expanding
to include various other aspects of trade in goods.27 From its inception,
the scope of the WTO's coverage was far more expansive, not only includ-
ing new obligations regarding trade in goods 28 but also covering such
18. Bernard Hoekman, The WTO: Functions and Basic Principles, in DEVELOPMENT,
TRADE, AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK 41, 41 (Bernard Hoekman et al. eds., 2002).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. GATT art. XXIX provided in part that most of its substantive international legal
commitments "shall be suspended on the day on which the Havana Charter enters into
force." See Havana Charter for the International Trade Organization, ch. VIII, reprinted
in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW HANDBOOK 83, 157 (2d ed. 2001). For discus-
sion, see generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 169 (1969)
and RAJ BHALA & KEVNIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAw 2 (1998).
22. Hoekman, supra note 18, at 41.
23. World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO - Members, http://www.wto.
org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tif-e/org6_e.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2006).
24. Hoekman, supra note 18, at 41.
25. Most of the Multilateral Trade Agreements of the Uruguay Round contain provi-
sions for special treatment concerning developing countries. See generally BHALA &
KENNEDY, supra note 21, at ch. 4.
26. Marrakesh Agreement, art. 11:2; see also Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute
Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 20
(1999).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Agreement on Agriculture, Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS), and Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, in Marrakesh Agreement,
Annex IA.
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entirely new areas as trade in services 29 and intellectual property.30 Per-
haps the most significant change from GATT to the WTO was the codifica-
tion of formal rules for dispute resolution.
B. Judicialization: The Modern Dispute Settlement System
The dispute settlement process that persisted under GATT generated
enormous criticism. It had no fixed timetable for resolution of disputes,
making the system very susceptible to delaying tactics: no provision auto-
matically established a panel upon filing of a complaint; there was no noti-
fication requirement for implementation of a panel recommendation;
3 1
and the adoption of a panel recommendation, as with any action by the
member countries collectively, required consensus (i.e., total unanimity)
which meant that, in theory, the losing party in a panel dispute could
essentially veto a panel's ruling to prevent it from gaining force.3 2 With its
lack of procedural formality, it may seem something of a wonder that the
GATT dispute settlement system worked at all. That it did work has been
credited to the fact that, in its early days, GATT "was essentially a small
'club' of like-minded trade officials who had been working together since
the . . . ITO negotiations," and therefore "did not need an elaborate deci-
sion-making procedure to generate an effective consensus .... -33 As mem-
bership in GATT grew, however, so too did the need for procedural
formality in the realm of dispute settlement. By the time of the Uruguay
Round, it had become clear that a major overhaul was needed. The result
was the DSU we see today.
In common with its predecessor system, the DSU makes certain
allowances for diplomatic resolution of disputes. By its terms, the DSU
makes a mutually agreed solution between parties the preferred resolution
of any dispute and, accordingly, such a solution is an alternative available
to the parties at any stage during a dispute.34 Additionally, the DSU pro-
29. See General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Marrakesh Agreement,
Annex lB.
30. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
Marrakesh Agreement, Annex IC.
31. In dispute settlement parlance, a panel ruling is referred to as a "recommenda-
tion," because the impaneled tribunal merely recommends an action to the aggregated
Dispute Settlement Body-basically the entire Ministerial Conference-which must then
vote on whether or not to "adopt" the ruling, i.e., give it force. "Implementation" refers to
actions taken by the respondent to comply with an adverse recommendation, e.g.,
removal of an offending trade barrier.
32. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 21, at 26. It should be noted that, in practice,
losing respondents under GATT had seldom used their veto, because members seemed
to understand that their long-term interest in having a stable forum for dispute resolu-
tion generally outweighed their interest in maintaining a particular trade barrier. Still,
the replacement of the consensus rule with the "negative consensus" rule is justifiably
regarded as one of the major reforms under the WTO. Under the new system, the final
panel report becomes effective automatically, unless there is unanimous consensus
among members-including the victorious complainant-to block it. For obvious rea-
sons, this has yet to happen.
33. Hudec, supra note 26, at 5-6.
34. DSU art. 3.7.
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vides a number of institutional alternatives to a formal panel proceeding.3 5
Moreover, certain diplomatic steps are required of the parties before any
litigation may commence. When one WTO member country believes that
another has taken WTO-inconsistent measures, its first option is limited to
a request for mandatory bilateral consultations. 3 6 The aggrieved party
("complainant") notifies in writing both the member country in question
("respondent") and the DSB37 of the particular measures it finds objection-
able, and the legal basis for its objection.38 In submitting the request the
complainant thereby formally invokes the DSU and notifies the public at
large of the existence of a dispute. Clearly, the DSU's authors hoped this
first stage would also be the last. Often, it is: A majority of disputes are
resolved during bilateral consultation and never reach the next stage. 39
However, if the parties cannot reach a mutually agreed solution within 60
days, the complainant automatically gains the option to request adjudica-
tion by a panel.40
For disputes that reach this next stage, the complainant submits its
request for a panel to the DSB, setting forth once more the complained-of
measures and the legal grounds for the complaint.41 The request, though
brief, requires careful drafting by the complainant, as it establishes the
terms of reference which will determine the scope of review during adjudi-
cation of the dispute.42 Put another way, the panel's jurisdiction is con-
fined to a factual examination of the measures specifically identified by the
complainant and the treaty provisions specifically cited as bases for the
complaint, and appellate review exclusively treats the latter.4 3 Following
submission of the complainant's request, an attempt is made to convene a
panel at the next meeting of the DSB. Here is one of the few remaining
situations in which the old GATT consensus rules still apply.44 If desired,
the respondent may block the establishment of the panel by single-
handedly upsetting the consensus. However, such a move by the respon-
35. Id. art. 4.7.
36. Id. art. 4.
37. Note that the Dispute Settlement Body is simply the Ministerial Conference of
the WTO (which consists of a delegate from every member nation) when acting in its
dispute settlement capacity; the DSB can be seen as one of the various "hats" that the
Conference may wear.
38. DSU art. 4.4.
39. Some put the figure at more than 55%. See, e.g., Marc L. Busch & Eric Rein-
hardt, Testing International Trade Law: Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settle-
ment, in THE POLITIcAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
ROBERT E. HUDEC, 457, 467 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James Southwick eds., 2002); see
also World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Chapter 6,
The Process - Stages in a Typical WTO Dispute Settlement Case, n.4, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop e/dispu e/disp settlement-cbt e/c6s2pl-e.htm#fnt4 (last visited July 8,
2006).
40. See DSU art. 4.7. Note, too, that a party may request a panel before the expira-
tion of 60 days if the responding party has failed to respect deadlines for negotiation, or
if both parties agree that negotiations have failed to produce a mutually agreed solution.
41. DSU art. 6.2.
42. Id. art. 7.1.
43. Id.
44. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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dent is a mere delaying tactic; if the same request again arises at a second
meeting of the DSB-usually only a month later but sometimes even
sooner-the so-called "negative consensus" rules operate and permit the
complainant to force the establishment of a panel.
45
Panels, usually consisting of three members, are composed ad hoc for
each dispute that arises. 46 The Secretariat keeps a running list of potential
panelists,4 7 each of whom meets certain standards of independence and
expertise.48 The list ordinarily consists of the trade delegates of WTO
member countries, but may also include other qualified persons, such as
former secretariat officials, or retired academics sitting on a part-time
basis.4 9 When the time comes to convene a panel, the Secretariat nomi-
nates candidates, usually from this list.5 0 For "compelling reasons," either
party may oppose a nominee, forcing the Secretariat to nominate
another.5 1 By the terms of the DSU, there does not appear to be any theo-
retical limit on the maximum number of times a party may reject a panel-
ist, but there is a practical limit; if after 20 days a panel has not been agreed
upon, either party may request intervention by the Director-General, who
may appoint panelists over the adverse party's objections. 5 2 if a dispute
involves a developing country against a developed country, the developing
country may require that at least one panelist also be from a developing
country.
5 3
The panel examination resembles a courtroom procedure but is less
formal. Following written submissions by the parties, the panel examina-
tion typically involves two meetings with the parties, neither of which is
open to the public.5 4 Following initial deliberations, and the delivery of an
interim report upon which parties may request review,5 5 the final panel
report is delivered to the parties, usually no more than six months from the
panel's composition.5 6 Within three months, it is issued to the DSB, which
may "adopt" it, i.e., vote to make it binding on the parties.5 7 At this point,
the losing party has an automatic right of appeal.
58 As discussed above,5 9
this is one of the major changes from the GATT procedures. A permanent
Appeals Body, consisting of seven members, conducts a review limited to
45. DSU art. 6.1.
46. Id. art. 8. By agreement of the parties, five panelists may sit.
47. Id. art. 8.4.
48. Id. arts. 8.1, 8.2.
49. World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Chapter
6, The Process - Stages in a Typical WTO Dispute Settlement Case, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/dispue/disp-settlement cbte/c6s3p2.e.htm (last visited Sept. 3,
2006).
50. Id.
51. DSU art. 8.6.
52. Id.
53. Id. art. 8.10.
54. Id. art. 12.
55. Id. art. 15.2.
56. Id. art. 12.8; app. 3, para. 12(j).
57. DSU art. 12.9; app. 3, para. 12(k).
58. Id. arts. 16.4, 17.
59. See supra, Introduction.
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questions of law, and then proceeds to affirm, modify, or reverse the
panel's original report.60 Finally, after the appeal, the report is once again
issued to the DSB for adoption.
6 1
Once adopted, it then falls to the losing party to undertake "implemen-
tation" of the panel's recommendation.6 2 This usually means that the
respondent is recommended to discontinue the WTO-inconsistent measure
that gave rise to the complaint. 63 Since it is not always feasible to remove
the measure immediately (e.g., because of market conditions or domestic
political hurdles), the respondent is given a "reasonable period of time" to
comply, which varies from case to case.64 The parties have the option of
negotiating voluntary compensation for the complainant pending full
implementation by the respondent.
65
Sometimes the losing party simply fails to implement the panel's rec-
ommendation. When this happens, the complainant has the option, 30
days after the lapse of the reasonable period of time, to request the right to
suspend concessions with the losing party pending implementation. 66 In
the literature, the suspension of concessions is referred to, variously, as
"sanctions," "countermeasures," "retorsion," "reprisal," and "punish-
ment."'67 Whatever one calls it, the effect is to excuse the injured party
from its treaty obligations to the respondent to an extent commensurate
with its injury. It is considered preferable, should a mutual agreement fail,
for the "losing" respondent in litigation to remove the WTO-inconsistent
policy, rather than for the "winning" complainant to impose sanctions. 68
Countermeasures are seen as an absolute last resort.
69
II. The Debate: How Well is the DSU Performing?
A. Confidence in the System: How Extensively is the DSU Used?
How much faith do member countries place in the DSU? It is widely
believed that the extent to which the system is used is a good indication of
the amount of confidence members place in the system. After all, "[a] tri-
bunal that is used is more successful than a tribunal that is not used."70
60. DSU art. 17.6.
61. Id. art. 17.14.
62. Id. art. 21.3.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. art. 22.2.
66. DSU art. 22.
67. See generally ELISABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF
COUNTERMEASURES (1984).
68. DSU art. 22.1; see also WTO SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREE-
MENTS 1, 20 (2002).
69. This makes sense. Suspension of concessions, after all, effectively answers a
WTO-inconsistent trade barrier with another WTO-inconsistent trade barrier. It has
been argued that there is something perverse about the WTO authorizing sanctions that
subvert the very goals of the organization. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO
Trade Sanctions, 95:4 AM. J. INT'L L. 792, 810 (2001).
70. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, A Theory of International Adjudication, 40 (Feb.
2004) (U. Chi. L. Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper Series No. 206), availa-
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Accordingly, numerous critics who have praised the DSU have pointed to a
dramatic increase in dispute settlement activity immediately following the
establishment of the WTO. Conversely, the lack of dispute settlement
activity under GATT is often cited as evidence of its comparative ineffec-
tiveness in this area. 71 As then Director-General Ruggiero stated in 1998,
"[slome 106 cases have been brought to the WTO in the first three years of
its existence, compared to approximately 300 cases throughout the life of
the GATT-and many more of these cases are being brought by developing
countries, underlining their growing faith in the system. ' '7 2 Reasonable
though this assumption may seem, it has since been subject to close scru-
tiny in the scholarly literature. What follows in this subsection is a sample
of the prevailing rebuttals.
In a 1999 article, Robert E. Hudec sought to evaluate the optimistic
proposition that the observed flurry of new dispute settlement activity
evinced an enthusiastic reception by member nations embracing the
newer, better, rules-based DSU. 73 Prior to the establishment of the WTO,
the number of disputes had been trending gently upward. 74 The question,
then, was what might account for the dramatic spike immediately follow-
ing the Uruguay Rounds. By Hudec's rough calculation, the surplus of
cases following Uruguay (i.e., the amount by which the actual number of
cases exceeded the number predicted for the period by extrapolating from
the upward trend under GATT) was 46 (98 minus 52). 7 5 Of these 46 cases,
20 were brought under TRIPS (General Agreement on Trade in Services),
GATS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), or under the
new agreements on agriculture and textiles-agreements in areas formerly
not covered by GATT.76 Another 10 cases, though not brought under
newly created substantive obligations, were brought under the newly
revised SPS and TRIMS (Trade-Related Investment Measures), which made
ble at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs_201-25/206-eap-jy.tribunals.
pdf. This proposition is not entirely uncontroversial. As Eric Reinhardt has pointed out,
"increasing litigation in domestic civil courts is almost always seen as costly and ineffi-
cient as compared to settlement out of court; why should trade litigation be different?"
Eric Reinhardt, Aggressive Multilateralism: The Determinants of GATT/VTO Dispute Ini-
tiation, 1948-1998, prepared for delivery at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the International
Studies Association, Washington, D.C., Feb. 17-20, at 25, available at http://userwww.
service.emory.edu/-erein/research/initiation.pdf (internal citations omitted). Still,
since "[miost legal scholars infer the success of GATT/WTO from the rising numbers of
disputes," id. at 11-12, I concede the premise arguendo for the purposes of this Note.
71. See, e.g., SOUTH CENTRE, ISSUES REGARDING THE REVIEW OF THE WI10 DISPUTE SET-
TLEMENT MECHANISM 2 (Trade Related Agenda, Development, and Equity Working Paper
Series No. 1, 1999) (suggesting that "by far the most important factor" in accounting for
the lack of developing country dispute settlement activity in the pre-GATT WTO, was the
"lack of trust in the system").
72. Ruggiero, supra note 14.
73. See generally Hudec, supra note 26.
74. Id. at 16.
75. Id. at 17-18. Note that Hudec's count (98) varies from that of Former Director-
General Ruggiero (106) and from that of other scholars referenced herein. Such vari-
ances result from differences among scholars concerning how to count disputes for the
purposes of controlling their sample data.
76. Id. at 18-19.
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them functionally friendlier to complainants. As Hudec points out, we
need only assume that three of these ten cases would not have been
brought under GATT in order to conclude that fully half of the increase in
dispute settlement activity for the period was attributable to disputes over
new substantive obligations, rather than to an influx of member countries
hoping to avail themselves of the new-and-improved procedures.
7 7
Additionally, one must consider the impact of the single undertaking
principle, under which all nations-developing and developed alike-were
expected to sign onto all multilateral trade agreements covered by the
WTO, and be subject to the same austerity. 78 As mentioned above, there
were exceptions to the rule but, by and large, poorer countries were held to
the same standards as richer ones and, more importantly, to higher stan-
dards than had been imposed under GATT. This heightened austerity led
to 25 cases being brought against developing countries that could not have
been brought under GATT. 7 9 Hudec points out that, since there is little
overlap between these 25 cases, and the (at least) 20 cases attributable to
new obligations, "there is a strong case for saying that substantially all the
increase in WTO litigation can be traced to the new or intensified obliga-
tions of the Uruguay Round."80
In another study, also published in 1999, Eric Reinhardt uncovered
additional reasons to be skeptical of the apparent increase.8 1 Reinhardt
hypothesized a variety of factors, unrelated to institutional reform, that
might account for much of the variation in the frequency of DSU usage
following the establishment of the WTO. In a vast, first-of-its-kind empiri-
cal examination of the then-current data, Reinhardt used multiple regres-
sion analysis in an attempt to determine whether variables concerning the
relationships among member countries and their markets might accurately
predict the likelihood that any state would be involved in a dispute settle-
ment action against another state. A number of factors did indeed yield
statistically significant increases in this probability. For example, control-
ling for other factors, a member country is more likely to file a complaint
against a country which has previously filed a complaint against it.8 2 Rein-
77. Id. at 19. Note that this proposition has been questioned. As Reinhardt has
pointed out, GATT art. XXIII had always allowed complaints regarding sectors and trade
measures not specifically enumerated in the agreement, through its "very permissive
,nullification or impairment' clause," which effectively enabled complainants to allege
that a respondent's trade measure, though not facially violative of the treaty, had none-
theless produced a GATT-inconsistent effect. Reinhardt, supra note 70, at n.51. Thus,
Reinhardt concludes, "such conflicts are not new to the WTO, and hence the legal
expansion of GATT in this regard is probably not responsible for the growth in disputes
over time." Id. Reinhardt appears to be conjecturing here, as he confines his observa-
tions to a footnote and supplies no data. For this reason, I too devote a footnote to his
objections, rather than evaluating them at length.
78. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
79. Hudec, supra note 26, at 20.
80. Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).
81. See generally Reinhardt, supra note 70.
82. Id. at 2-3.
Cornell International Law Journal
hardt calls this the "countersuit effect."'8 3 Additionally, a country is more
likely to bring a complaint against a trade measure that has already become
the subject of an outstanding complaint filed by a third country.8 4 This
Reinhardt refers to as "bandwagoning."8 5 What these two factors have in
common is that they involve situations in which prior dispute activity
begets more dispute activity. In other words, far from being grounds for
praise, any increase in disputes related to these two factors ought to count
against the effectiveness of the DSU, at least as measured by its ability to
put disputes to rest. As Reinhardt puts it, "[clomplaints arise today dispro-
portionately because of the failure of the dispute settlement regime to facili-
tate successful resolution of previous complaints.
'8 6
Still more important is Reinhardt's evaluation of trade dependence as
a predictor of DSU-usage. In evaluating the probability of a bilateral dis-
pute between any two countries, Reinhardt defines "trade dependence," for
each country, as "the sum of imports from and exports to the partner
country, divided by gross domestic product (GDP). ' '8 7 The hypothesis is
that the probability of disputes occurring over measures affecting a partic-
ular market rises as a function of that market's importance to the econo-
mies of the prospective disputants. Here, value-of-trade as a percentage of
GDP supplies an intuitively satisfying proxy for the degree of importance.
Reinhardt's findings are telling. As predicted, he finds that "a state is more
likely to initiate disputes and to be targeted as well when a high proportion
of its GDP derives from imports and exports with its partner."8 8 In other
words, as countries become more dependent on foreign trade for their fis-
cal health generally, disputes are proportionately likelier to arise. Thus,
increased trade dependence, rather than institutional reform, seems to
account for the increase in dispute settlement activity. Indeed, after con-
trolling for this factor over time, Reinhardt concludes that "the probability
of dispute initiation between any two countries has not risen ... under the
WTO regime, ceteris paribus."
8 9
More recently, other scholars who have interrogated the data have
reached comparable conclusions. One study, by Eric Posner and John Yoo,
found that much of the observed increase in DSB usage can be explained
simply by controlling for the number of member states in the WTO.90
Writing in early 2004, they begin by comparing the number of complaints
that had then been filed under the WTO (227) to the number that had
arisen under the entire history of GATT from 1948 to 1994 (432).91 At
83. Id. at 14.
84. Id. at 12.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
87. Reinhardt, supra note 70, at 15.
88. Id. at 19.
89. Id. at 2-3.
90. Posner & Yoo, supra note 70, at 40.
91. Id. Again, note that this figure varies-here by a wide margin-from Ruggiero's
number. See Ruggiero, supra note 14, at 70. As discussed supra note 75, different schol-
ars employ different methods in counting a single "dispute."
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first blush, this reveals a significant increase from 9.2 disputes per year
under GATT to 37.9 under the WTO. On closer inspection, however, the
increase appears somewhat illusory. First, it is necessary to control for
outlier years during the GATT period, which artificially deflate the usage
statistics. For instance, during the first ten years following the establish-
ment of the EC, Europe's use of the GATT dispute settlement procedures
was on practical hiatus, such that including this period in any study would
yield an unrepresentatively low per-annum mean. 92 For this reason, Pos-
ner and Yoo confine their comparison period to 1989-1994 which, by
itself, boosts GATT's usage rate to 20.3 complaints per year.9 3 Next, by
indexing for the number of member states during the subject periods- 105
and 132, respectively-they close the gap even further finding 0.19 com-
plaints per state per year for GATT, as compared with 0.29 for the WTO.
94
Finally, the authors take their analysis one step further, and argue that a
valid comparison should control not only for the number of states but also
for the number of state pairs. The argument is based on factorial analysis:
Since the number of potential conflicts rises nonlinearly as a function of
the number of states participating, state pairing arguably presents a more
accurate predictor of increased dispute activity. Viewed this way, the data
reveal .0037 complaints per state pair per year under GATT, as compared
to .0044 under the WTO-a negligible difference.
95
Hudec and Reinhardt both published in 1999, and covered a period
during which there was an undisputed explosion of new dispute settlement
activity under the WTO. Posner and Yoo, though writing far more recently,
still confronted a body of data that, at least on its face, suggested a high
per-annum rate of usage relative to that of GATT. What is interesting
today, and what immediately confronts any researcher who seeks to
"update" the work of Hudec and others-say, by looking at more recent
data in search of patterns corresponding to those observed early on-is
that the apparent "surplus" of cases now seems to have dissipated. DSU
usage grew robustly from 1995 until 1997, peaking at 49 cases in that year.
1998 saw only 40 cases and, through 2003, the number of new cases per
year remained between 20 and 40. In 2004, the number declined to a then-
record low of 18, only to be cut nearly in half again in 2005, during which
there were a mere 10 new cases.9 6
92. Posner & Yoo, supra note 70, at 40; see also ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL
SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 216-217 (1975); ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 229
(1993) (discussing various causes, including consolidation of the EC, for the "sudden
halt" in dispute activity between 1959 and 1967).
93. Posner & Yoo, supra note 70, at 40.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. These are my own counts, from data available at the WTO's website, http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu-e/dispu-status-e.htmu#yr2005 (last visited Jan. 1,
2006). As discussed supra notes 75, 91, counting methods differ among researchers and
it should be noted that my method is, in some respects, less sophisticated than that
favored by others. For example, some researchers will find more (or fewer) disputes
than the number of named disputes recorded by the WTO. This is so because many
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This erosion, however, does not completely foreclose further inquiries
of the sort that interested Hudec. One might still evaluate the basis-for-
dispute statistics of the current-albeit depleted-volume of cases. In so
doing, one may be able to strengthen the conclusions of Hudec, Reinhardt,
and others, possibly demonstrating that, in the waning years of GATT,
member countries had been "saving up" potential disputes in anticipation
of the new system, or that the temporary surplus after Uruguay reflected an
explosion of long overdue objections to trade measures in sectors now cov-
ered by the WTO. Such a project is beyond the scope of the present Note,
however, and will have to await future research. For now, I conclude this
subsection by proposing that the scholarly investigation of the increase in
dispute settlement activity has gone a long way toward dispelling the opti-
mistic notion that such an increase is the product of a stronger, healthier,
or more confidence-inspiring dispute settlement mechanism. Rather, the
increase probably stems from such factors as (i) new and more severe sub-
stantive obligations, (ii) increasing WTO-membership, (iii) increased trade
dependence, and (iv) the system's own failure to resolve prior disputes.
B. Equal Access: Developing Countries and the DSU
Just how well do poor countries fare under the new system? As with
the discussion of the effectiveness of the DSU in general, this question has
prompted a great deal of scholarly debate, as scholars have struggled to
determine whether-and if so, why-developing countries are under-utiliz-
ing the DSU. Before engaging this debate, a brief review of the major disad-
vantages thought to be facing poor countries will be useful, as it will map
out the landscape in which the various research questions arise.
1. The Hypotheses: Possible Obstacles to Developing Country Dispute
Participation
Broadly speaking, economists expect that an exporting country faced
with a disputable trade measure will seek to resolve it through formal dis-
pute resolution if, and only if, the expected benefits of litigation exceed the
expected costs, where the expected benefit is the gain that would accrue to
the exporter following successful resolution of the dispute multiplied by
the probability that the dispute will be resolved successfully. 9 7 This decep-
scholars prefer to count only "bilateral disputes" and thus fragment situations in which
multiple complainants bring an action against a single respondent into multiple "dis-
putes"-one for each complainant. On the other hand, researchers will often combine
two or more named disputes and count them as one, when substantially similar issues
are re-litigated. These approaches are not mutually exclusive, and some researchers will
use both in the same count. So, for example, if three complainants bring an a single
named dispute concerning one respondent's trade measure, and a fourth complainant
brings a separate named dispute against the same respondent, concerning the same
measure, some researchers would count four disputes, since a single issue is the subject
of four complaints. While this approach has much to recommend it, I choose, for sim-
plicity's sake, to confine my count to the number of named disputes and undertook no
such adjustments.
97. Chad P. Bown, Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complaints, Interested
Parties, and Free Riders, 19:2 WORLD BANK ECON. REv. 287, 297 (2005).
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tively simple formula masks more variables than at first appear. For exam-
ple, this formula assumes that an exporting country is aware of the
disputable trade measure in the first place. In fact, developing countries
may be much less equipped to identify WTO-inconsistent measures than
their wealthier counterparts. 98 This is due in large part to the fact that
developing countries, both in the public and private sectors, tend to lack
the domestic expertise necessary to identify these disputes.9 9 These defi-
cits form part of what may be referred to as a human capital problem in
developing countries. In developed countries, the private sector is highly
vigilant in monitoring and patrolling its own market access rights,10 0 and
the governments tend, at the very least, to have effective mechanisms in
place for public-private interaction. 10 1 In these countries, by the time a
disputable case lands on the trade minister's desk, much of the legal leg
work, in terms of compiling facts, conducting economic analysis, and
researching the legal basis for the complaint, has already been done by
members of the industry associations whose sectors are most affected.
10 2
Such mechanisms are largely absent in developing countries.
The human capital factor manifests itself in other ways as well, not the
least in that developing countries are simply unrepresented or under-
represented at the WTO in Geneva. 10 3 Constantine Michalopoulos was, to
my knowledge, the first scholar to examine the locations and sizes of WTO
"missions" as possible indicators of the quality of countries' WTO repre-
sentation. Now somewhat out of date, his findings are nevertheless
instructive. As of his writing, there were 65 developing country missions in
Geneva, and another 26 elsewhere in Europe, while seven developing coun-
tries' trade representatives operated out of their home capitals. 10 4 By con-
trast, all but one of the developed countries had full-time trade
representation at the WTO. 10 5 Michalopoulos also found that "of the 29
98. See, e.g., Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 39, at 477 (observing that developing
countries "are often not in a position to recognize and take advantage of potential meri-
torious complaints because they have zero or few in-house experts").
99. Bown & Hoekman, supra note 6, at 871-72.
100. See generally GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNER-
SHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION (2003).
101. Shaffer points out, for example, that "[s]ections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974
set forth a procedure for the USTR to investigate and take action against foreign trade
barriers in response to petitions filed by private firms and associations." Id. at 21
(emphasis in original); see also Henrik Horn et al., Is the Use of the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment System Biased?, 14 (Centre for Econ. Pol'y Res., Discussion Paper Series No. 2340,
1999) (pointing out that, in addition to the better funding of trade ministries in wealth-
ier nations, they also "maintain well-oiled routines for handling complaints by the
domestic export industry"); and Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, WTO Dis-
pute Settlement, Transparency and Surveillance, 23:4 WORLD ECON. 527, 532 (2000)
(observing that developing countries "are well equipped with legal talent, are well
briefed by export interests, and have a worldwide network of commercial and diplo-
matic representation that feeds their systems with relevant data").
102. 'SHAFFER, supra note 100, at 21.
103. See generally Constantine Michalopoulos, The Developing Countries in the WTO,
22:1 WORLD EcON. 117 (1999).
104. Id. at 123.
105. Id.
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least developed country members, only 12 had representations in Geneva,
and that most all of the small island economies were represented from mis-
sions in Europe or from their capitals."'
10 6
As to size, Michalopoulos considered not only the comparative sizes of
developed and developing country missions but also attempted to estimate
the minimum mission size sufficient to manage the typical workload that it
could expect to encounter, in order to see whether developing countries
were represented adequately. He cited a study estimating an average 40 to
45 scheduled WTO meetings per work week, suggesting that a staff of at
least four to five people would constitute the minimum "effective represen-
tation." 10 7 According to these estimates, there were, in addition to the 33
developing countries that had no mission in Geneva, another 17 whose
missions were inadequately staffed. 10 8 Add to these another six, for whom
an arrears in dues rendered their missions formally inactive, and the total
percentage of inadequately represented developing countries came to
nearly 60%.109 I would argue that, if the all too common lack of human
capital in developing countries can be shown to impact their ability to iden-
tify and pursue cases, there will be a strong basis for saying that these
countries have become casualties of the judicialization of dispute settle-
ment under the WTO. This is so because the increasingly complex WTO
laws raise barriers to dispute settlement that disparately filter out poorer
countries, which are under-resourced in terms of legal and economic
expertise.
A closely related issue, also on the cost side of the equation, concerns
the cost of litigation itself. The cost here may seem to fit under the rubric of
human capital, but I feel it deserves its own category; once litigation is in
prospect, legal expertise is readily (if not always affordably) available for
hire in a way that full-time, in-house economic expertise is not. Hence, the
costs associated with litigating a claim are distinct from the costs of identi-
fying a claim in the first place. In any case, this problem is directly related
to my thesis. As judicialization demands increasingly sophisticated legal
talent, it drives up the cost of formal dispute settlement, which is dispro-
portionately burdensome to developing countries. This has to do with
economies of scale. Whereas the value of removing a trading partner's
WTO-inconsistent trade measure varies with the volume of a potential com-
plainant's exports to that partner, the cost of legal services does not.
Hence, smaller, poorer countries, with smaller volumes of trade, are more
likely to tolerate WTO-inconsistent measures because, at best, litigation
costs for such countries represent a greater percentage of the expected gain
and, at worst, they make that gain cost-prohibitive.
Still another cost-one perhaps poorly captured by the above
formula-is what might be called political economic cost. It has been
pointed out that poor countries are more likely than rich ones to be
106. Id. at 125.
107. Id. at 126.
108. Id.
109. Michalopoulos, supra note 103, at 126-27.
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beholden to potential respondent countries for development assistance.11 0
It is easy to see how this could have a chilling effect on a developing coun-
try's willingness to initiate a dispute. A developing country's vulnerability
to various extra-WTO modes of retaliation may cause it to eschew formal
dispute settlement in favor of preserving delicate diplomatic balances with
more powerful nations. This cost, if it proves significant, relates to the sec-
ond part of my thesis. That is, this cost is not directly attributable to the
new judicial features of the WTO but is instead a throwback to the old
GATT power-based model which the DSU has yet to rectify. As I hope to
show below, this problem may be amenable to solutions that would involve
increasing the judicial character of the organization.
Moving to the benefit side of the equation, again we find more vari-
ables than initially meet the eye, particularly with respect to the problem of
calculating the probability of successful resolution. Not only must the pro-
spective complainant attempt to calculate the likelihood that it will prevail
on the merits-that it will secure a favorable judicial outcome-but it must
also weigh its chances for securing a favorable economic outcome, a much
broader question. Recall that the WTO is, in essence, nothing more than a
collection of "self-enforcing agreements""' 1 with no overarching sovereign
capable of compelling compliance with its directives. In the event of non-
implementation by a losing respondent, the complainant's last recourse is
to seek permission from the DSB to suspend concessions with the respon-
dent.1 12 As should be obvious, this remedy may be wholly inadequate and
even counterproductive. To illustrate why, imagine a developing country A
exporting a product x to a developed country B, which has imposed a
WTO-inconsistent trade barrier on A's access to B's market for x. Further
suppose that developing country A is one of dozens of small countries
importing a product y from developed country B. As such a small
importer, A may not be able to inflict sufficient economic harm on B to
induce compliance. And if, in suspending concessions, A would thereby
harm its own citizens by driving up the domestic price of product y, the
available "remedy" is not only ineffective but actually harmful.
A prospective complainant that finds itself in this unhappy position
may be said to lack retaliatory capacity against the prospective respon-
dent. 113 If it appears probable that the respondent will not comply, and
that countermeasures would be an inadequate substitute for compliance, a
rationally acting developing country will choose to live with the offending
WTO-inconsistent measure, rather than pursue costly and unprofitable liti-
gation-a choice a richer country may not have to make. And of course, a
logical corollary is that a rationally acting richer country, with the same
knowledge, will choose to impose unfair trade measures, because
threatened repercussions lack the "teeth" to change economic incentives.
110. Bown & Hoekman, supra note 6, at 863.
111. Id. at 865.
112. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
113. Bown & Hoekman, supra note 6, at 866.
Cornell International Law Journal
These are some of the major issues thought to burden developing
countries today. This list is by no means exhaustive; it is only meant as a
sample of the controversies in this area. As will be shown in the next sub-
section, there is indeed a great deal of controversy.
2. The Arguments: Are Developing Countries Really Underutilizing
the DSU?
A preliminary question is whether developing countries are in fact
under-using the DSU. This question is surprisingly thorny. Some have
optimistically pointed out that developing countries use the new DSU more
often than they used the GATT dispute settlement procedures. 114 While
true, this trend must be placed in context. Perhaps the most obvious con-
text is to consider not only the raw number of developing country com-
plaints pre- and post-WTO but also the rate of developing country
participation as compared to that of developed country participation. As
Hudec pointed out in his early examination of the data, the share of com-
plaints brought by the US or EC increased from 45% under GATT to 54%
during the first three years of the WTO, when overall dispute activity was
still apparently on the rise. 115 During this same period, the percentage
brought by developing countries held constant at 31%.116 While the US
and EC were respondents in 64% of cases brought under GATT, they were
respondents in only 41% of cases brought under the WTO. 117 And while
the representation of smaller developed country respondents (e.g., Japan,
Switzerland, etc.) decreased slightly from 22% to 20%, there was a remark-
able three-fold increase in the percentage of cases in which developing
countries were respondents, from 13% under GATT to 39% under the
WTO.
118
Some have argued, however, that usage rate alone supplies an inade-
quate context. A "country," after all, is an artificial political unit, and the
developed/developing distinction may be a rather blunt classificatory
instrument. With this in mind, a number of scholars, in the tradition of
Reinhardt, have sought to uncover the underlying predictors of DSU-usage
by any particular country. On the basis of such factors, many have argued
that the apparent disparity in usage rates between rich and poor countries
does not in fact reflect systemic bias. One example is a study by Peter
Holmes et al. who, writing in 2003, argued that trade share is "a pretty
robust indicator" of a country's likelihood to be involved in a dispute, and
"thus, the frequently remarked-on absence of [developing countries] from
the dispute-settlement system can be explained by their low volume of
trade." 119 This argument can appear quite persuasive; even without sup-
114. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
115. Hudec, supra note 26, at 22.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 24.
118. Id.
119. Peter Holmes et al., Emerging Trends in WTO Dispute Settlement: Back to the
GATT?, 2 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 3133, 2003). Note
that, in their paper, "trade share" refers to a country's share of global trade, as opposed
Vol. 39
2006 Trappings of Legality
porting data, it is intuitively satisfying. If it can be shown that countries
are using the DSU in proportion to their share of global trade, and that the
share of global trade tends to correspond to development status, then it
would appear that trade share is the unseen "common cause" that under-
lies both the large amount of DSU participation by rich countries, and the
small amount by poor. Rather than some systemic bias at fault, rich and
poor alike are simply using the system to a degree consistent with their
needs. It turns out that, when the data are added, the model performs
fairly well. The authors find that trade share correlates to the frequency of
a country's appearance before the DSB as complainant with an r2 of 0.8012
and, as respondent, with an r2 of 0.8858-both statistically significant
figures. 120 Moreover, multiple regressions considering other indicia of
national poverty (e.g., income per capita) show that they do little to explain
the variation in dispute settlement involvement. 121 In the authors' succinct
words, "a large poor country doing lots of trade is as likely to be a [dispu-
tant] as a small rich one with the same trade value."'
1 22
Similar arguments appear elsewhere in the literature. In an earlier and
better known study by Henrik Horn et al., probability modeling is used to
test the hypothesis that the likelihood of encountering a disputable trade
measure (and thus, the likelihood of appearing before the DSB) "is pro-
portional to the diversity of a country's exports over products and part-
ners ... "123 This would mean that "larger and more diversified exporters
would be expected to bring more complaints than smaller and less diversi-
fied exporters."'124 Once again, the hypothesis satisfies intuition. It seems
reasonable to suspect that, other things being equal, a country doing a cer-
tain amount of trade in one market or with one partner would find itself
facing fewer opportunities for conflict than a country doing the same vol-
ume of trade in multiple markets or with multiple trading partners. And,
once again, the model performs fairly well. "It is shown," the authors
write, "that the theoretical distribution of disputes generated by this simple
incidence model goes quite far toward predicting the actual pattern of com-
plaints across countries." 1 2 5 Since poorer countries tend to be less diversi-
fied in terms of both products and trading partners, this study, like
Holmes', tends to suggest that countries across the development spectrum
are using the dispute settlement system approximately as much as they
"should" be, as predicted by an objective measure of need, and that there is
no under-use by developing countries.
Arguably, even Reinhardt himself can be read as supplying some sup-
port for this type of idea (though probably above his own objections). In
to, say, its import/export activity as a percentage of GDP, as some economists use the
term.
120. Id. at 30. R-squared is simply a measure of the explanatory or predictive power
of a model. It ranges from 0 to 1; the closer to 1, the better the model.
121. Id. at 13.
122. Id.
123. Horn et. al., supra note 101, at 2.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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his discussion of trade dependence as a predictor of DSU usage, he notes
that the patterns he observes hold true "even when one factors in the role
of relative GDP size and [developing country] status."12 6 So, just as
Holmes and Horn have done in their studies, Reinhardt appears to show
that a factor unrelated to development status is a better predictor of DSU
usage than development status itself. It would seem, therefore, that these
three studies can be cited together for the proposition that WTO member
countries are utilizing the dispute settlement system commensurately with
their needs, as measured by such factors as trade share, trade dependence,
and export diversity, and that any apparent under-use by developing coun-
tries is simply an artifact of their lower trade share, lower trade depen-
dence, and lower export diversity. In other words, the under-
representation is purely coincidental. So why worry?
As it turns out, there remain grounds for concern. Two features of the
above studies deserve closer attention. First, the authors themselves vary
widely in their optimism. Holmes et al. are the most optimistic, conclud-
ing that poor countries are not, in fact, underrepresented in the system.
Horn et al. are more cautious and qualify their findings by admitting that
their model fails to explain certain facets of the data, such as the extreme
overuse of the DSU mechanism by the US and EC.12 7 Reinhardt is least
apologetic for the WTO's perceived failures. Some of the changes inaugu-
rated by the new regime have, in his words, "backfired." 128 Although, as
discussed above, Reinhardt finds that "the probability of dispute initiation
by any two countries has not risen" under the WTO, 129 he also notes that
this is true "except against developing countries."' 30  As Reinhardt
explains, "the WTO has raised the probability that disputes will be filed
against [developing countries] by up to 4.7 times . . . while lowering the
prospects for initiation by [developing countries] by as much as a
third.' 3 1 Notwithstanding the predictive power of trade dependence in
explaining the overall increase in dispute activity, it does not "explain
away" the disparities in DSU participation between rich and poor member
countries. As Reinhardt and Busch have written elsewhere, "[developing
countries] are one-third less likely to file complaints against developed
states under the WTO than they were under [GATT]," even after controlling
for trade dependence. 
132
A second concern centers on a feature common to all of the above-
discussed studies. Each study depends upon probabilistic proxies for the
"predicted" volume of dispute settlement activity and compares the pre-
dicted and observed volumes of activity. The need for such statistical prox-
ies should be obvious: We have no realistic way of knowing how many
126. Reinhardt, supra note 70, at 19.
127. Horn et al., supra note 101, at 12.
128. Reinhardt, supra note 70, at 4.
129. Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 19 (emphasis in original).
132. Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 39, at 467 (emphasis in original).
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disputes may exist in the world that do not generate a formal complaint.
Horn et al. state the problem elegantly:
If we knew the extent to which countries are affected by disputable trade
measures ... we could immediately determine whether there are any biases
in the propensity to bring complaints to the [DSU] by simply comparing the
distribution of complaints with that of [disputable measures]. The problem
is of course that the distribution of [disputable measures] is unobservable
since only a subset of all potential disputes arrive at the WTO.
133
There is, in short, no denominator, no way to rationalize the number of
disputes that become visible by being litigated before the DSB.
Additionally, intuitions vary as to what this missing denominator may
look like from one economic sector to another. In other words, researchers
disagree as to how disputable trade measures are likely to be distributed
across various markets. As Horn et al. note, "[slome would argue that the
correlation between legal trade barriers . . . and [disputable trade mea-
sures] is likely to be positive," given the supposition that the powerful sec-
tors, most successful in lobbying their governments for lawful protections,
will be the same sectors whose lobbying efforts result in legally doubtful
protections. 134 The problem, of course, is that "it could equally be the
other way round."'135 That is, sectors "already protected by regular trade
barriers have presumably less need for additional trade measures of a
doubtful nature."'13 6 Without any way to break this tie, the authors were
forced to assume, for their study, that disputable trade measures are ran-
domly and uniformly distributed across markets, products, and trading
partners. This assumption is rather controversial.
Several recent studies have taken a variety of innovative approaches to
this data problem. Chad P. Bown, in 2005, devised a particularly creative
method of generating a complaints-filed-to-complaints-possible ratio, albeit
within a manageably small sample space. 13 7 He began by taking a sample
of all unique disputes during a five year period. 138 Next, he coded them
according to the type of product involved and used trade data from the
United Nations in order to identify nations that, as exporters in the
affected product market, had interests (as potential complainants) in the
outcomes of these disputes. 139 Because the DSU permits multiple coun-
tries to bring a dispute action as co-complainants or, alternatively, to join
ongoing disputes as interested third parties, Bown's method produces a
quick snapshot of the countries that could have joined disputes but chose
not to. From here, Bown is able to analyze the joiners and the non-joiners
to see if any characteristics (e.g., development status) appear to make par-
133. Horn et. al., supra note 101, at 4.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 5.
136. Id.
137. Bown, supra note 97, at 287.
138. "Unique" in this context denotes any case with a single WTO-inconsistent pol-
icy, respondent, and product or set of products. Id. at 295.
139. Specifically, Bown took data from the United Nations Center for Trade and
Development's (UNCTAD's) Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS). Id.
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ticipation more likely. The beauty of Bown's approach is that it uses data
that are commonly available (viz., complaints that have been filed) to gen-
erate a reasonable estimate with respect to data that are usually obscured
from view. He is, in short, able to quantify non-participation. While we
may never know, in absolute terms, how many disputable measures go
entirely unchallenged, we can know how many existing challenges go un-
joined by other interested parties. While we still do not have (and probably
never will have) a denominator that represents the universe of possible dis-
putes, we do have a denominator in the disputes filed.
After matching the information on disputes to the information on par-
ticipating exporters, Bown finds that, in 54 disputes, there were 89 com-
plainants, 65 affected exporters who joined as third parties, and fully 711
adversely affected exporters who did not participate. 140 Next, he looks for
evidence that various disadvantages facing developing countries were cor-
relative to decisions not to participate. 1 4 ' Because Bown has managed to
avoid the denominator problem, he is able to avail himself of very sensible
proxies (not the vague, highly debatable proxies referred to above) to quan-
tify and test for these disadvantages. As to the human capital problem,
Bown refers, as did Michalopoulos, to the size of each country's WTO dele-
gation in Geneva. 142 As to the problem of pure litigation cost, he simply
looks at each would-be complainant's GDP as a proxy for its capacity to
absorb such CoStS. 1 4 3 He accounts for the political economic cost problem
by looking at the amount of foreign aid a prospective complainant receives
from the respondent and, as a measure of retaliatory capacity, he uses the
share of the respondent's total exports to the developing country.144 Across
the board, Bown finds statistically significant positive correlations between
each of these factors and the decision by potentially interested parties not
to participate.
14 5
What makes these findings so useful is that they paint a richer, more
detailed picture than earlier studies that asked only whether developing
countries used the DSU "a lot" or "a little." Instead, we see developing
countries abstaining from the process in precisely those situations where,
based solely on their legal interest in the dispute, they should be participat-
ing. What these findings also suggest is that there may be yet another
problem facing developing countries. Closely related to their individual
cost problems, developing country participation rates may also reflect a
collective action problem. Since a successful dispute resolution can remove
a trade barrier that affects parties other than the complainant, many poten-
tial complainants will have an incentive to free-ride on the successful litiga-
tion of others.
140. Id. at 295-96.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 301.
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Another creative approach to this research is to avoid the data problem
altogether. A recent study by Kyle Bagwell et al. examines the relationship
between developing and developed complainants in those situations where
a complainant has already received a favorable ruling and the respondent
has not complied, such that the complainant has the option to request
countermeasures under DSU art. 22.4.146 The study first identified four
scenarios, jointly exhaustive of the possible permutations: (1) countermea-
sures may have been imposed and remained in place; (2) countermeasures
may have been imposed and resulted in implementation of the adverse rul-
ing by the losing respondent; (3) countermeasures may have been author-
ized but not imposed by the prevailing complainant; and (4)
countermeasures may never have been requested, despite non-implementa-
tion by the respondent. 14 7 The study then examined the cases in each of
these scenarios, seeking a relationship between a country's development
status and its position within this framework. The results for each scena-
rio are as follows: There were only two cases in which countermeasures
had been imposed and had remained in place through the date of the
study. 148 In each of those cases, both complainant and respondent were
developed countries. 149 There was only one case in which the countermea-
sures had led to implementation and, again, both parties were developed
countries. 15 0 In the third scenario, there were four cases in which counter-
measures had been requested and authorized, but in which the requesting
party had taken no further action.'15 One of these cases pitted a devel-
oped complainant against a developed respondent; in another case, the
contest was between a developed complainant and developing respondent;
and the remaining two cases involved developing complainants litigating
against developed respondents. 15 2 Finally, there were three cases in which,
despite lack of implementation, the complainant did not even bother to
request countermeasures.' 5 3 One of these was a case between two devel-
oped countries; the other two involved developing complainants against
developed respondents.' 54 Note from these data that there has never been
a single case in which a developing country complainant, prevailing on the
merits and faced with non-implementation of a DSB ruling, has imposed
sanctions.
Although Bagwell et al. are somewhat less precise than Bown (they use
OECD membership as a coarse proxy for development status and do not
peel away as many layers as Bown does in search of causal factors), their
findings are highly instructive. Just as Bown shows that there are situa-
146. See generally Kyle Bagwell et al., The Case for Tradable Remedies in WTO Dispute
Settlement (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 3314, 2004).
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tions in which developing countries are known to have an interest that they
choose not to litigate, Bagwell et al. show, perhaps even more strikingly,
that there are situations in which developing countries are known to have a
right that they choose not to enforce. These findings argue strongly for the
conclusion that retaliatory capacity and political economic costs are moti-
vating the decisions.
Space constraints prevent me from presenting a detailed summary of
the scholarship in this area. Suffice it to say in summary that, as research-
ers have brought increasingly sophisticated tools of empirical analysis to
bear on the question of developed country participation in the DSU, there
has been a steadily growing body of evidence to indicate systemic biases.
III. Judicialization: Problem and Solution
What emerges from the above evidence is the unfortunate irony that
the DSU, intended to reform the malfunctioning GATT dispute settlement
system, seems to have harmed those parties most in need of help. Develop-
ing countries, historically at a disadvantage in the diplomatic arena, were
supposed to find in the new DSU a system where the rule of law, rather
than wealth and power, would determine outcomes. Instead, the develop-
ing countries of the world have found a system that is costlier, more com-
plex, and more mechanical, but which has yet to redress some of the most
basic problems with a power-based system. As Busch and Reinhardt have
stated the problem:
By adding 26,000 pages of new treaty text ... ; by imposing several new
stages of legal activity per dispute, such as appeals, compliance reviews, and
compensation arbitration; [and] by judicializing proceedings and thus put-
ting a premium on sophisticated legal argumentation as opposed to informal
negotiation ... the WTO reforms have raised the hurdles facing [developing
countries] contemplating litigation.
155
What, then, is to be done? I would argue that the correct course is to
strive for more, not less, judicialization of the process. Despite the fact that
increasing complexity has placed greater and greater costs on developing
country participants, I believe that these costs could be offset by complet-
ing the process that the DSU has started.
In this section, I outline a brief list of reforms and demonstrate how
each could help soften or solve some of the problems identified above.
What these reforms have in common is that they are inspired by systems
already in place in other legal and judicial contexts, particularly in domes-
tic civil litigation systems.
A. Compensation
As discussed at some length above, 156 the optimal result available to a
prevailing complainant in a dispute settlement action under the DSU is the
155. Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 39, at 467.
156. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
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prospective removal of the offending trade barrier. What this means is
that, even disregarding the risk of non-implementation by the respondent,
the best a complainant can hope for is that the respondent's WTO-inconsis-
tent policies will not affect the complainant's future exports to that country.
Thus, in the cost/benefit calculus discussed above, 157 a potential com-
plainant with relatively low export volumes faces the discouraging prospect
that, even under the best scenario, it may take years to recoup expenses
incurred in litigating to remove the trade barriers-a risk exacerbated by
the fact that the time lapse between the initiation of a complaint and the
implementation of a panel ruling can easily run from two to three years. 158
One solution to this problem would be to take a page from contract
theory and introduce a mechanism for compulsory compensation,'
5 9
requiring the respondent to pay something akin to benefit-of-the-bargain
expectancy damages, including litigation CoStS. 1 6 0 If potential developing
country complainants could be assured of receiving damages retroactive at
least to the commencement of the action, they might be emboldened to
pursue meritorious claims, even when those claims imposed fairly high
short-term transaction costs. This is because such a provision would per-
mit a potential complainant to confine its cost/benefit analysis to the actual
merits of its complaint, regardless of extrinsic economic factors. As a corol-
lary, respondents should be less likely to make a scorched-earth, dilatory
defense of a losing case, because there would be less (if anything) to gain
from doing so. Such a reform would also pose little risk of inviting a spate
of unmeritorious "strike suits," because complainants could only be
assured of recovering their status quo ante when they actually prevailed at
the DSB. Thus, there would be no incentive to expend resources on a case
unlikely to succeed. Finally, this reform may also help ameliorate the col-
157. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
158. This estimate is generated by simply summing the stated timeframes for various
dispute phases in the DSU itself. I have not undertaken an empirical examination of the
average length of time that elapses in practice, but such estimates do appear in the litera-
ture and in official documents. See, e.g., Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body,
Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,
Proposal by Mexico, TN/DS/W/23 (Nov. 4, 2002) [hereinafter "Proposal by Mexico"]
(putting the average length of time at three years).
159. Throughout this subsection, distinguish my use of the word "compensation"
from the concept that appears in the DSU. There are provisions for negotiating interim
"compensation" pending implementation, see DSU art. 22.1, but this form of compensa-
tion differs from what I envision in several important respects. First, it begins after the
lapse of the reasonable period of time and is strictly voluntary. In other words, what is
contemplated by the terms of the DSU is an alternative to suspension of concessions
failing implementation and, therefore, like suspension of concessions, it is strictly pro-
spective in nature. There is no provision in the current DSU for compulsory retroactive
compensation in addition to implementation. Another important difference is that, as I
use the term, I imagine monetary compensation-an actual payment by the respondent
to the complainant-whereas "compensation" in the DSU may take other forms, such as
compensatory concessions in other markets.
160. Suggestions to this effect already appear in the literature. See, e.g., Joost
Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules Are Rules- Toward a More
Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 335, 345-46 (2000).
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lective action problem 161 because, rather than having an incentive to free
ride on another nation's successful action, affected non-participants would
stand to gain less than the nations who actually brought the case: Non-
participants would continue to enjoy the removal of the offending trade-
barrier, but only named complainants would be entitled to receive compen-
satory payments from the respondent.
One criticism I anticipate here is that I only address the best case sce-
nario for complainants, and that this reform would have no impact on
those situations where a recalcitrant respondent simply failed to implement
a ruling. As has been pointed out elsewhere, 162 one advantage suspension
of concessions has over compulsory remedies is that the former are self-
implementing; the complainant can suspend concessions unilaterally,
which requires no cooperation by the respondent. It is true that when par-
ties to a system flout the rules, there is scant comfort in creating bigger,
more demanding rules for them to flout. There are two answers to this
critique, however. First, it should be noted that, absent any other changes
to the system, this proposal at least does no harm (the current remedy of
suspension of concessions would still be available in the case of a non-
implementing respondent). Second, there are other amendments that
could add "teeth" to the proposed measure. Since the "teething" proposal
cross-cuts several of the proposals for compulsory remedies, I reserve com-
ment on that subject for its own subsection below. 163
B. Compulsory Implementation vs. Efficient Breach
Here, I would like to propose two alternative possibilities, both of
which relate closely to the compensation issue discussed in the previous
subsection. It is often proposed that the DSU could be amended to provide
for compulsory removal of WTO-inconsistent trade measures.' 64 Cur-
rently, the removal of such measures is, of course, not mandatory, nor is
the ongoing payment of compensation to the complainant during non-
implementation; the only remedy of which the complainant can be assured
is its own ability to suspend concessions. Hence, a proposed amendment
providing for compulsory implementation of panel recommendations
would not be incompatible with the above proposal for retroactive (as
opposed to ongoing) compensatory payments. 165 I therefore second those
who have recommended that compliance with panel rulings be made
compulsory.
However, in acknowledgement of the political resistance such a propo-
sal is likely to encounter, I would also like to propose a softer alternative,
this one borrowing from the (admittedly controversial) concept of efficient
breach in contract theory. Under this alternative proposal, the DSU could
161. See supra Part II.B.2.
162. See, e.g., Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 555 (1996).
163. See infra notes 182-186 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., SOUTH CENTRE, supra note 71, at 31.
165. See supra notes 156-163 and accompanying text.
Vol. 39
2006 Trappings of Legality
be amended to make ongoing (or "interim") monetary compensation com-
pulsory but would leave it to the discretion of the respondent to remove or
leave in place the offending trade barrier that gave rise to the dispute. The
result would be that a losing respondent that found it more affordable to
make continued payments to the complainant than to remove the barrier
for all imports, would have the option of doing just that. Thus, the prevail-
ing complainant would be made whole (even inclusive of retroactive
"expectancy" damages), and the losing respondent would be better off than
it would have been had it been forced into total compliance.
In common with the above proposal concerning retroactive compensa-
tion, this proposal has the potential to empower weaker would-be com-
plainants. It would supply a corrective to the now flawed litigation
incentives because a developing country complainant with a meritorious
claim would be assured of realizing the real value of that claim, whether
through reduced trade barriers, or through compensation commensurate
with the value of its (nominally continuing) injury. Moreover, this propo-
sal might have some impact on the collective action problem, 1 66 since there
would be no incentive to wait for other complainants to go to Geneva
where, likely as not, they would simply be "bought off," generating no posi-
tive externalities for those exporters who remained on the sidelines. How-
ever, it must be acknowledged that this proposal is not without potentially
serious flaws. For example, it would appear to violate the spirit of one of
the fundamental principles of the WTO, viz., the "most favored nation"
status each member is to accord every other member. By letting a losing
respondent make a separate peace with a prevailing complainant, the prac-
tical consequence would be nearly indistinguishable from permitting the
respondent to set a special tariff schedule for the complainant. I say
"nearly" indistinguishable because, as I envision monetary compensation,
the complainant would presumably receive rebates from the respondent,
rather than having its products receive actual differential tax treatment in
the marketplace. But this remedy would still create the unseemly appear-
ance of the rich country bribing the poor one to keep its mouth shut, all
under color of law. For this reason, the proposal should be treated with
great caution. Still, the imagined outcome in this situation does not differ
greatly from an outcome already possible in the current system, in which
voluntary compensation is negotiated while the underlying disputed mea-
sure remains in place perhaps indefinitely. 167
C. Independent Prosecutor
One proposal that has begun surfacing in the literature, inspired by
domestic civil and criminal justice systems, is for the WTO Secretariat to
create an office whose mandate would resemble that of an independent
166. See supra Part II.B.2.
167. True, under the current system, any compensatory concession (as opposed to
monetary payments) has to be offered on a most-favored-nation basis, meaning it cannot
benefit the complainant alone. But it easy to imagine a respondent working around this
difficulty by offering compensation in a market dominated by the complainant.
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prosecutor. 16 8 As of this writing, I am unaware of any scholar who has
proposed a detailed enumeration of what responsibilities such an office
might include. In brief, it would simply be an office authorized to bring
dispute actions against countries that had taken WTO-inconsistent mea-
sures-actions that, today, can only be brought by member country com-
plainants. Clearly, it would be difficult to imagine this office being of
much use outside the context of a system that also provided for compul-
sory implementation of panel rulings. This follows from the fact that, with
no complainant to suspend concessions, the only obvious remedy would
be for the respondent to remove its trade barrier. Thus, as with most of the
proposals I discuss, this is primarily intended as a component of a larger
bundle of judicializing measures that make more sense together than they
do in isolation. Nevertheless, this proposal may still have some value as a
freestanding measure. For example, an action by an independent prosecu-
tor would obviously have to name markets affected such that, following a
successful "prosecution," the DSB could authorize suspension of conces-
sions by all affected exporters in the relevant market in one fell swoop.
Alternatively, the DSU could be amended to authorize monetary fines in
these cases.
The major benefits of the independent prosecutor proposal would lie
in its effects on the problems of human capital, 169 litigation costs, 170 and
political economic costs. 1 7 1 It would improve upon the current system in
the pre-litigation stage because a centralized, multilateral body, backed by
all the resources of the Secretariat, would have the funding and legal exper-
tise to identify and pursue potential claims, particularly on behalf of devel-
oping countries that often have difficulty identifying such claims for
themselves. It would improve the litigation stage for substantially the same
reason: A full-time staff of lawyers within the Secretariat's office would
"try" cases before DSB panels, easing the burden on developing countries,
which would otherwise have to contract for costly legal services. Finally,
because cases would be brought on behalf of, rather than by the developing
countries most affected, WTO-inconsistent trade barriers could be targeted
without weaker complainants first having to summon the temerity to chal-
lenge stronger countries with whom they have diplomatic relationships, or
on whom they depend for foreign aid. In short, this would bypass many of
the hurdles associated with political economic costs.
Chief objections to this proposal are likely to include the following.
First, there is the problem of generating the political will necessary to cre-
ate such an office. It is difficult to imagine member countries funding an
office whose work would potentially run contrary to their own economic
interests. As to this objection I have no good answer, other than to say that
the proposal is consistent with the larger goal of securing market access
168. See, e.g., Hoekman et al., supra note 101, at 538; see also Bown, supra note 97, at
293.
169. See supra notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
170. See supra pp. 116-17.
171. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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rights and promoting efficiency in the global economy through the princi-
ple of comparative advantage. The long term benefits of pursuing this
objective should, in theory, benefit all member countries. I can only say
that members should consider this proposal, although it may be unrealistic
to say that they are likely to do so.
Second, some critics will be understandably concerned that the pro-
posed office would compromise the impartiality of the WTO Secretariat. It
is, of course, important that the Secretariat not be seen as taking sides in
an adversarial process. In response, I would point out that there is ample
precedent for the formation of similar semi-autonomous offices whose
independent functions have not been deleterious to the neutrality of the
larger organizations they serve. Administrative agencies in the United
States, for example, conduct quasi-judicial hearings in which both the pros-
ecutor and the administrative law judge (or "ALJ") are technically within
the agency's chain of command but in which neither is permitted to influ-
ence the course of the other's work. Although this system has attracted
some criticism,1 7 2 most agree that it is unproblematic.
In the interests of maintaining prosecutorial independence, the WTO
could remove the hiring, promotion, and retention of prosecutors from the
discretion of the Secretariat. For example, the appointment of prosecutors
could be made subject to approval by consensus of the Ministerial Confer-
ence, and their service could run for a fixed term of years during which
they could not be removed except for cause. Such measures would not
only insulate prosecutors from the influence of the Secretariat during their
decision-making process but would also insulate the Secretariat from even
the appearance of impropriety.
D. "Public Defenders"
A related proposal involves providing free or deeply discounted legal
services for developing country respondents in dispute settlement
actions. 17 3 Provisions in the DSU already provide for legal assistance to
developing countries. 17 4 However, this assistance falls well short of what
is needed, for reasons both formal and practical. Formally, the DSU limits
the assistance available to the provision of technical advice. Legal experts
in the Secretariat's office may assist developing countries "in a manner
ensuring the continued impartiality of the Secretariat,"' 175 but they may
not act as advocates. In other words, these experts are officially proscribed
from rendering the advice that developing countries most need; they can-
not discuss legal strategies calculated to secure the favorable disposition of
a case. 176 As a practical matter, there are simply too few of these experts to
go around. In fact, there are only two, and "[tiheir services are available
172. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HAv. L.
REv. 1231 (1994).
173. See, e.g., SOUTH CENTRE, supra note 71, at 29.
174. DSU art. 27.2.
175. Id.
176. SOUTH CENTRE, supra note 71, at 23.
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for a total of four person days a month, roughly 400 hours a year-which is
usually not enough to deal with one case."
1 7 7
There have been various efforts to address the problem of litigation
costs facing developing countries. For example, 2001 saw the establish-
ment of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), an inter-governmental
organization, independent of the WTO, whose mission is "to provide legal
training, support and advice on WTO law and dispute settlement proce-
dures to developing countries. ",178 Still, more is needed. The ACWL
and organizations like it depend for their funding on voluntary contribu-
tions and, to date, some of the world's richest economies (notably, the US,
Japan, and the EU) have not contributed to the ACWL's endowment. 179 In
order to put developing country respondents on a level field vis-A-vis
wealthier complainants, legal assistance, up to and including outright advo-
cacy, should be provided through the WTO itself.
Here, I anticipate objections similar to those raised in the above dis-
cussion of independent prosecutors. The establishment of a permanent
defense counsel to assist poor countries would undoubtedly meet with stiff
political resistance, perhaps from the very countries that have opted not to
contribute to the ACWL. And again, I have no good answer to this objec-
tion, other than to say that the idea, properly viewed, is intended for the
benefit of all nations, and not just those developing countries it helps
directly. The issue of impartiality will also resurface here and, again, I
would argue that there are numerous options for ensuring the indepen-
dence of developing country advocates.
As to the issue of impartiality, there remains one objection that is
unique to the permanent defense counsel's office. There is a difference
between the sort of "independence" required of an independent prosecutor,
and the sort that would be relevant to an office assisting respondent coun-
tries. With prosecutors, the Secretariat could conserve its impartiality by
removing itself from the process by which prosecutors choose which cases
they pursue. A permanent defense counsel's office, however, though inde-
pendent of the Secretariat, can never be impartial as between interested
parties because, by definition, it is taking sides. Whereas prosecutors
would be seen as pursuing cases for the greater public good, the defense
counsel would be assisting individual member countries in their disputes
against other member countries. In this sense, the contemplated office is
imperfectly analogous to the type of office that gives this subsection its
title: Whereas "public defenders" are appointed to defend actions brought
by the state, a permanent defense counsel of the WTO would be defending
parties against other parties. A correct analogy might be to a system that
would supply court-appointed counsel to indigent defendants in, say,
divorce cases-hardly an uncontroversial proposition.
177. Michalopoulos, supra note 103, at 138.
178. Advisory Centre on WTO Law, About Us, http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/about-e.
aspx (last visited July 8, 2006).
179. Bown & Hoekman, supra note 6, at 875 n.25.
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Valid though the above objection may be, I submit that the proposed
office is still desirable. To a degree rarely seen in domestic civil litigation,
WTO dispute resolution has sweeping effects beyond the mere allocation
of rights and duties between litigants. As noted above, correct dispute reso-
lution will often generate positive externalities since the parties involved
are seldom the only participants in the market in which the dispute
arises. 180 But even if we imagine a dispute limited to two trading partners,
we still have their individual citizens to consider. As Bown and Hoekman
have observed, securing market access rights through sound dispute reso-
lution "reduces uncertainty, increasing the likelihood that firms and indi-
viduals in countries on both the export and import sides of international
transactions make mutually beneficial, relationship-specific invest-
ments." 18 1 Thus, in evaluating the importance of defense counsel, analo-
gizing to domestic civil litigation may fail because there is far more at stake
in WTO litigation. Because it may result in the exploitative removal of
valid, legal trade measures, the prospect of a developing country respon-
dent losing not because its claim was unmeritorious, but because of inade-
quate counsel, should be at least as troubling as the conviction of an
innocent individual criminal defendant.
E. Small Claims
One interesting proposal that deserves brief mention here, recognizing
that the size of claims varies greatly, is that the DSU might benefit from
some degree of scalability. As Hoekman et al. have observed: "[Jiust as a
low wage worker's wrongful termination suit ought not to be litigated
before the US Supreme Court, the DSU should be reserved for the more
'important' issues and not be used to address disputes that pertain to small
trade volumes." 18 2 I agree. It is perhaps surprising that, while virtually
every domestic legal system in the world has some stratification of its
courts, with higher courts often setting amount-in-controversy minimums,
there is as yet no analog on the global stage. The creation of smaller panels
for smaller disputes may be a significant improvement over the current,
one-size-fits-all system. Just as domestic small claims courts facilitate inex-
pensive access to judicial process, a leaner panel system (perhaps permit-
ting adjudication of small cases by a single panelist) could provide
developing countries with a third choice, between the current extremes of a
costly, full-dress panel proceeding on the one hand, and simply tolerating a
disputable trade measure on the other. Hence, a "small claims court for
the world" deserves serious consideration.
F. Enforcing Panel Rulings: Giving the WTO Teeth
As to many of the proposals sketched out above, it has been noted that
little can be done to enforce them. Despite my heavy reliance in this Note
180. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
181. Bown & Hoekman, supra note 6, at 862.
182. Hoekman et al., supra note 101, at 536.
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on analogies to domestic judicial processes, the element of the analogy
most conspicuous by its absence is a sovereign entity. The WTO is, after
all, not a government. As has been pointed out elsewhere, "[t]he WTO has
no jail-house, no bailbondsmen, no blue helmets, no truncheons or tear
gas." 18 3 However, from the fact that the organization lacks Leviathan sta-
tus, it does not follow that it must be entirely impotent with respect to the
behavior of its members. The DSU could be amended to create greater
incentives for the prompt implementation of panel rulings.
One option that has been suggested would provide for "joint retalia-
tory action by all WTO members against the offending member which has
refused to either remove the offending measure or to pay compensa-
tion ... "184 Rather than leaving it to the respondent to suspend conces-
sions or other obligations, this device would simply have all member
nations withdraw the respondent's market access rights. A harsh measure
to be sure, it has much to recommend it. A respondent who has failed to
implement a panel recommendation is in breach of at least two WTO provi-
sions: (1) the panel ruling itself, and (2) the substantive provision that gave
rise to the panel ruling in the first place. Such a respondent is continuing
to enjoy many of the benefits of WTO membership while failing to honor
those obligations on which membership is supposedly conditioned. Intui-
tively, it only makes sense that, while such behavior persists, the offending
country should forfeit the benefits of membership. When such forfeiture
includes all market access rights, rather than just those granted by the
complainant, only then will the WTO truly be a multilateral organization,
rather than just a multilateral forum to administer a collection of bilateral
relationships.
For those who find the above proposal extreme, there are gentler alter-
natives available. One option might be to suspend voting rights, financial
assistance, and other incidentals of membership, effectively treating non-
compliant respondents as though they were in arrears in their dues.18 5 A
weakness in this proposal is simply that the WTO does not vote often and
does not provide much in the way of financial assistance in the first
place.' 8 6 A slightly stronger alternative might be to suspend the respon-
dent's right to initiate dispute actions as a complainant.
Another rather elegant idea, a variant of which has already been offi-
cially proposed by Mexico, 18 7 is that remedies, in terms of suspension of
concessions, should be tradable. At first, this proposal does not seem a
perfect fit with the bundle of reforms I envision, in part because it is not
immediately apparent that it is inspired by domestic judicial process, and
183. Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More,
90 AM. J. INT'L L. 416, 417 (1996).
184. SOUTH CENTRE, supra note 71, at 31.
185. See generally HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M, BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITU-
TIONAL LAw, §§ 1445-1561 (1999).
186. Charnovitz, supra note 69, at 827.
187. See Proposal by Mexico, supra note 158; see also Bagwell et al., supra note 146.
Note that my discussion in this subsection is not an analysis of the Mexican proposal
itself, but merely a discussion of tradable remedies generally.
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in part because the imposition of compulsory compensatory payments pro-
posed above' 8 8 would appear to render this proposal superfluous. As to
the first point, I would say that, in fact, the assignability of remedies does
have close analogs in domestic law: A judgment against a party is, after all,
a debt, and debts are ordinarily market-alienable. As to the second point, I
admit that in the world I imagine there would ideally be little place for the
assignment of remedies, because a respondent would be compelled either
to remove trade barriers or, alternatively, to make compensatory payments,
thus obviating the need for unilateral suspension of concessions by the
complainant. Still, the assignability proposal may be just the sort of mea-
sure that would put "teeth" behind the other proposals I envision. That is,
after providing for assignable remedies, countries may never actually have
occasion to assign them because the threat alone would induce
compliance.
How, exactly, would the proposal work? As I envision it, the proposal
would simply enable a prevailing complainant to sell (perhaps at auction)
its right to suspend concessions with the losing respondent to a third coun-
try (or countries). To illustrate the value of such a proposal, let us recon-
sider the case of hypothetical countries A and B discussed above, only now
let us put some (admittedly exaggerated) numbers to it. Suppose that B's
WTO-inconsistent restrictions inflict a $1 billion "injury" on A in loss of
market access. Now suppose that A has received a favorable panel ruling
against B (and, of course, that B has not complied after a reasonable period
of time) such that A is authorized to suspend concessions. Further sup-
pose that A's volume of import from B is such that, after its retaliatory
suspension of concessions, A can expect to harm B to the tune of $1 mil-
lion per year. As a Texas alumnus, I am reminded of the old joke about the
Oklahoma Sooner (I invite the reader to substitute your own favorite sports
rival), ecstatic after winning his state's lottery, payable in $1 installments
per year for a million years. Practically, A's "remedy" under the current
system is worthless.
Under some version of the Mexican proposal, by the simple expedient
of permitting A to sell its right to suspend concessions to a larger importer
(or even to several smaller importers), we would expect to see the market
value of that right begin to approximate its face value. That is, a nominal $1
billion in remedies would suddenly be worth an actual $1 billion, both to
the complainant and the respondent, thus correcting the incentives for
compliance and, by extension, for initiating (and defending) litigation in
the first place. This proposal would therefore help alleviate the retaliatory
capacity problem, since the relevant capacity would be that of the import
market as a whole, rather than merely the complainant's share of that mar-
ket. Finally, this proposal has the additional benefit of being more or less
unilaterally enforceable, unlike compulsory compensation. True, the rem-
edy is not strictly unilateral since, obviously, other countries would be
188. See supra notes 163-166.
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involved. But it is unilateral in the more relevant sense that it requires no
cooperation by the respondent.
Conclusion
The WTO is failing in its stated goals of supplying stable dispute set-
tlement and stimulating growth in the developing world. True, the judicial-
ized dispute settlement system of today appears to get more use than did its
diplomacy-based GATT predecessor, but this increased usage appears to be
the result of increasing WTO membership, increasing trade dependence,
and the new substantive obligations covered by the DSU. And while devel-
oping countries are using the DSU at a greater rate than they used the
GATT dispute mechanism, there is evidence that, as complainants, they are
underutilizing the system relative to the number of disputable claims they
may have, while they are appearing disproportionately as respondents.
The under-use seems to be the result of problems relating to human capi-
tal, litigation costs, political economic costs, and retaliatory capacity. The
human capital and litigation costs have probably gotten worse under the
WTO as a direct result of the judicializing "reforms" of the DSU, while the
problems relating to wealth and power-political economic costs and retali-
atory capacity-are no better now than they were under GATT. The dis-
pute settlement system as of today straddles the border between two
worlds: It has one foot in the costly world of highly formalized litigation
that, though adorned with all the trappings of legality, nevertheless leaves
the other foot planted firmly in a world where treaties are only as good as
their signers' willingness to comply with them. Dealing, as it does, in two
worlds, the system has in some ways harvested the worst of both. The
promises of reform have so far disappointed.
Happily, the system is amenable to repairs. By finishing what has
been started, and further borrowing from the model of domestic litigation
and adjudication, the system can be made to deliver on the promise of the
rule of law. The DSU should be amended to provide for a degree of expec-
tancy-type compensation, rather than just the prospective removal of trade
barriers or negotiated interim compensation. It should discourage non-
implementation by losing respondents by making removal of trade barriers
(or, at least, interim compensation) compulsory rather than voluntary. For
such compulsory measures, enforcement power could be provided either
by suspending a respondent's market access rights with respect to all WTO
member countries pending implementation, or by letting the injured com-
plainant sell its right to suspend concessions to other countries with the
economic leverage to realize the value of that right. These reforms would
do much to address the problem of retaliatory capacity that currently
plagues developing countries.
Additionally, the DSU should be amended to provide for independent
prosecutors, which would address the problems of litigation and political
economic costs, as well as the human capital problem. A permanent
defense counsel should be established to assist developing countries who
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are targets of dispute actions by developed countries, thus easing the bur-
den of litigation cost in these actions. Finally, a provision should be made
for the inexpensive adjudication of smaller claims, thereby reducing litiga-
tion costs in such actions and facilitating developing country access to
effective dispute settlement.

